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Executive Summary 
 
Analytical context 
 
The present paper introduces country-by-country overviews of survey results from 
nationally representative samples from Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia and 
Montenegro, analyzing the link between some important socio-demographic factors 
and various measures of social capital, as well as at looking for support of some 
assumptions underlying different policy proposals targeting the level of social capital. 
 
The theoretical starting point of the analysis is a trust-focused definition of social 
capital, offered in Pippidi (2004, p. 4). Under this definition, social capital is 
understood to represent “the underlying confidence, which informs behaviour that an 
individual as a general rule would be treated equally and fairly regardless of the 
person or organization that he or she encounters”. 
 
Based on this starting point, the overview of the surveys is focused on the degree to 
which their results are useful in describing the social capital situation in different 
countries in the region, and also in checking whether and which policy proposals 
related to social capital seem relevant for the respective countries. The approach is 
country-by-country description of survey findings. The reasons for this approach are, 
first, that it supplements the regional approach, taken in Pippidi (2004), and, second, 
that it allows a deeper look at the importance of country idiosyncratic factors, which 
cannot be assumed to have the same structure and impact across countries. 
 
After a brief contextual introduction for each country, the analysis focuses on three 
dependent variables, describing social capital (social trust, interpersonal trust, and 
membership in informal organizations) whose links with various socio-demographic 
factors in the given country are examined. The factors are gender, age, education, 
ethnic, income, and residential structure of the respective societies. The results are 
then applied for a critical look at different assumptions underlying the existing policy 
prescriptions with respect to social capital in general and in the Balkans in particular. 
 
Main results  
 
The brief look at the context in each of the four countries indicates that they do form a 
region, characterized by relatively low levels of economic development, coupled with 
the need to complete various major social reforms, and with generally rich ethnic 
composition and relatively large minorities. 
 
The formal analysis of the impact of socio-demographic factors on the different 
measures of social capital results in the conclusion that these factors cannot serve as 
an explanation of the variations in social capital in all four surveys. In most cases, 
gender, age, and income have very weak explanatory power. Even though the lack of 
statistically discernible link may be due to some nonlinearities between age and social 
capital, and to the overall low level of incomes in the region, this result is informative. 
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Education is a statistically significant determinant of social capital in some cases, but 
there are substantive differences between countries – the strongest example being the 
exactly opposite impact of education on social capital in Serbia and in Montenegro. 
 
In all surveys, ethnic structure is relevant in explaining part of the variation of social 
capital. Since ethnic structure is strongly country specific, the results are also highly 
specific for each country and no general inferences can be made for the whole region. 
 
Possibly the most consistently important factor is the type of place of residence of the 
respondents, with most of the time the link being negative, indicating that people 
living in smaller settlements tend to exhibit higher levels of social capital. 
 
Policy implications 
 
Social capital is policy relevant, because it is believed that it is positively related with 
political and economic performance of societies, and also that if enhancement of this 
performance is to be achieved, measures targeting social capital are necessary. 
Sotiropoulos (2004, pp. 5-9) outlines six strategies aiming at increasing social capital. 
All of them are based on some specific assumptions about social causality between 
some set of policy actions and social capital. The survey data allow an initial 
assessment of whether these assumptions are realistic with respect to societies in 
Southeastern Europe, and from there whether and which policy proposals seem 
applicable and potentially effective for the region. 
 
The data and analytical results allow initial conclusions about the relevance of four 
assumptions: that good institutional performance leads to higher social trust, that 
economic development leads to higher personal confidence and from there to higher 
social capital, that local institutions are more trusted and thus generate higher social 
capital than more distant national institutions, and that increased personal security 
results in higher social capital. The four surveys support one of these assumptions, 
very tentatively support for another one, and provide no support for the other two. 
 
The assumption, which is relatively well conforming with the survey results from 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro, is that empowerment of local 
authorities may enhance social trust and civic participation. This is due to the fact that 
people feel more empowered with local institutions. 
 
The assumption which is very tentatively supported, is that improvements in 
institutional performance cause higher subjective evaluations of this performance and 
from there – higher trust. While such a link can be found in the data, it is weak, and 
will take a very long time to work on its own. 
 
The assumptions which find no support in the four surveys, are that income and 
general economic well-being result in higher social capital, and that enhanced 
personal security is also positively related to social capital.  
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I. Theoretical introduction 
 
The theoretical starting point of the country-by-country overview of issues related to 
social capital, presented below, is a trust-focused definition of social capital, offered 
in Pippidi (2004, p. 4). Under this definition, social capital is understood to represent 
“the underlying confidence, which informs behavior that an individual as a general 
rule would be treated equally and fairly regardless of the person or organization that 
he or she encounters”. The major goal of this definition is to separate the issue of 
“trust” from the issue of how this trust is enacted through various human 
organizations, such as associations or networks. For this reason, in the following 
country overviews, the focus of attention and analysis is the link between various 
factors characterizing the respective societies and two measures of trust: interpersonal 
trust and social trust. 
 
While the distinction between perceptions, on the one side, and organization and 
behavior, on the other, is operationally and analytically important, understanding how 
a specific society works requires also understanding the factors influencing 
organization and behavior, so far as perceptions are not their only determinants. For 
this reason, in the country overviews a glance is also thrown at how the already 
mentioned societal factors are linked with social actions, such as the underlined by 
Putnam membership in informal societal organizations. 
 
With respect to the policy relevance of the country overviews, an attempt is made to 
use the data base formed by the surveys in the respective countries to see whether the 
field data are supportive for some of the assumptions supporting the different policy 
proposals. Social capital is policy relevant, because it is believed that it is positively 
related with political and economic performance of societies, and also that if 
enhancement of this performance is to be achieved, measures targeting social capital 
are necessary. This widely popular belief, however, does not easily translate into 
undisputed policies due to the fact that various models of the links between social 
capital and the performance of societies lead to different, sometimes contradictory, 
policy recommendations. 
 
Sotiropoulos (2004, pp. 5-9) outlines six strategies aiming at increasing social capital. 
All of them are based on some specific assumptions about social causality between 
some set of policy actions and social capital. The survey data allow an initial 
assessment of whether these assumptions are realistic with respect to societies in 
Southeastern Europe, and from there whether and which policy proposals seem 
applicable and potentially effective for the region. 
 
More specifically, a deeper look will be thrown at the assumptions underlying four of 
the strategies discussed in Sotiropoulos (2004). One such strategy is the “top-down” 
strategy, which recommends a “state building” program based on the assumption that 
there is a link between the performance of legitimate and well working public 
institutions and social trust. Another such strategy is economic development, which is 
based on the assumption that there is a causal link from the size of individual 
resources (wealth, status, knowledge), to a sense of subjective well-being, and from 
there to higher levels of trust. A third, similar to economic development, strategy is 
increase in security, both hard and soft. The assumption there is that if a person feels 
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secure for her body, property, and livelihood, she is supposedly more ready to trust 
others. The fourth strategy involves reinforcement of local institutions, which can 
gradually build trust through the increased ability of local government and local 
collective action initiatives to develop visibly successful projects. The assumption 
here is that, due to their “closeness” to the people and to the naturally lower 
monitoring costs, local institutions are more likely to develop a reputation as 
trustworthy in the eyes of the citizens. 
 
II. Structure of the presentation 
 
The overview of the surveys presented below is focused on the degree to which their 
results are useful in describing the social capital situation in different countries in the 
region, and also in checking whether and which policy proposals related to social 
capital seem relevant for the respective countries. The approach is country-by-country 
description of survey findings. The reasons for this approach are, first, that it 
supplements the regional approach, taken in Pippidi (2004), and, second, that it allows 
a deeper look at the importance of country idiosyncratic factors, which cannot be 
assumed to have the same structure and impact across countries. 
 
Thus each country overview contains an introductory part, highlighting the specifics 
of the country in terms of its underlying structure – most importantly, its ethnic 
structure, its level of economic development presented by per capita income, and the 
present status of two of the most important social sectors (health and education) as 
representative of the overall level of reforms. After this contextual introduction, three 
dependent variables, describing social capital (social trust, interpersonal trust, and 
membership in informal organizations) are overviewed in their links with various 
socio-demographic factors in the given country. These factors are the gender, age, 
education, ethnic, income, and residential structure of the respective societies. 
 
Finally, each country overview will attempt to outline the support, or lack thereof, 
which the country data provide for the assumptions underlying the various policy 
proposals. More specifically, an attempt will be made to use the data to have a first 
look at whether there is connection between performance of public institutions and 
social capital, whether there is a link between level of personal resources, subjective 
well-being, and trust, whether indirect indicators of the level of personal security are 
related to social capital, and whether local institutions are more trusted. 
 
III. Country overviews 
 
As already mentioned, each country overview is composed of three parts: an 
introduction to the country context, a discussion of the impact of various socio-
demographic factors on social capital, and a critical look at the degree to which the 
data validate some of the assumptions underlying various policy proposals. 
 
The impact of the socio-demographic factors on various measures of social capital is 
formally studied by regressing four dependent variables on six independent variables 
(see Table 1). The four dependent variables include one describing social trust, two 
describing interpersonal trust, and one describing civic participation. The social trust 
variable is the first principle component of nine original variables from the country 
surveys, namely the subjective evaluations by the respondents of the degree to which 
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various public institutions serve the public interest. These institutions include political 
ones (president, government, parliament, local authorities), judiciary (courts and 
prosecution), security (police and army) ones, as well as the tax office. The two 
interpersonal variables are generalized trust (“do you agree that most people can be 
trusted”), and trust in kin (“do you agree that only your kin can be trusted”). The civic 
participation variable is formed by the answer to the question whether the respondent 
is a member of informal non-political organizations. The six socio-demographic 
variables are gender, age, education, ethnic identification, household income, and the 
type of the place of residence. 
 
Table 1. Social Capital Regressions 
Dependent variables Independent variables 
 
1. Social trust: principal component from 
“how do you evaluate the following 
institution in terms of serving the public 
interest” for the following institutions: 
· political institutions: president, 
government, parliament, local authorities; 
· judiciary: courts and prosecution; 
· security: police and army; 
· tax office 
 
2. Interpersonal trust: 
2.1.Generalized Trust: (“do you agree that 
most people can be trusted”) 
2.2.Trust in kin: (“do you agree that only 
your kin can be trusted”) 
 
3. Civic participation: member of informal non-
political organizations (yes or no) 
 
1. Gender 
 
2. Age (year of birth) 
 
3. Education (ordered 
from low to high) 
4. Ethnic identification 
(series of relevant 
ethnic dummy 
variables) 
5. Household income 
(ordered from low to 
high) 
6. Type of the place of 
residence (ordered 
from village to 
capital city) 
 
For each country, some of the socio-demographic factors are quite specific – most 
importantly the ethnic composition of the population, but also the educational and the 
income splits show differences between countries. The ethnic identification variable 
from the surveys is split into a set of ethnic dummy variables, depending on which 
ethnic minorities are relatively large for the given country. 
 
1. Bulgaria 
 
 1.a. Context 
 
Bulgaria is located in the Eastern part of the Balkans, and has a population of 7.8 
million people with more than 51% women. The ethnic composition of the country is 
about 84% Bulgarians, with two important minorities – 9-10% Turks, and 4-5% 
Roma. About 70% of the population is urban, which is the highest level of 
urbanization in the countries covered by the survey. 
 
In terms of economic situation, the GDP per capita in Bulgaria is EUR 2,290 for 2003 
(EUR 6,900 at Purchasing Power Parity), and the average gross monthly wage is EUR 
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145. In 2002, about 38% of the total population was employed, of which 8% in 
industry (all data are from WIIW Balkan Observatory). 
 
The healthcare system in Bulgaria, after undergoing series of reforms in the 1990s, is 
based on privatized primary care (outpatient facilities, pharmacies, laboratories, and 
the institution of the general practitioners), state-owned secondary care, and on the 
National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), which is financed through a tax and finances 
a portion of the cost for each patient. Most hospitals are still owned by the state, or by 
the municipalities. Private health insurance is very small. 
 
The education system of Bulgaria has three levels – primary, secondary, and higher 
education. School education is compulsory until age 16. The higher education system 
consists of three degrees – Bachelor, Master, and Doctor. About 2% of educational 
institutions in the country, including schools and universities, are private with their 
own financing. Public schools are entirely financed by the state, while public 
universities are financed both by the state, and by the collection of legally set student 
fees. Educational standards and curricula are entirely centrally determined by the 
Ministry of Education. 
 
The data source for Bulgaria is a quantity sociological survey, conducted from 25th 
October till 7th November 2003 by BBSS Gallup – Bulgaria. It is nationally 
representative survey among the Bulgarian population aged 18+. The achieved sample 
size amounts to 1 021 effective interviews. 
 
 1.b. Socio-demographic determinants of social capital 
 
Table 2 describes the regression results of the analysis of the impact of the six socio-
demographic factors on the various measures of social capital in Bulgaria. It provides 
a basis for some inferences about social capital in the Bulgarian context. 
 
The overall measures of social capital in Bulgaria are low. If the social trust variable 
is split into five ranges, 35% of the respondents will fall in the lower two ranges, 
37.5% - in the middle range, and 27.5% - in the top two ranges. At the same time, 
30% of the respondents claim trust in most people (while 47% disagree that most 
people can be trusted), vs. 66% claiming that only one’s kin can be trusted. Only 3% 
of the respondents are members of informal non-political organizations. 
 
The first inference is that socio-demographic factors have a very low explanatory 
power with respect to the four different measures of social capital in Bulgaria. This 
means that most of the variation in social capital in Bulgaria is due to factors and 
processes other than the socio-economic ones, which are traditionally used to 
categorize and analyze societies. 
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Table 2. Impact of socio-demographics on social capital in Bulgaria 
Interpersonal trust Variable 
name 
Social 
trust generalized kin 
Civic par-
ticipation 
Description 
Constant (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)  
Female -.004 
(.905) 
.019 
(.562) 
.022 
(.520) 
.010 
(.769) 
0 if male, 1 if female 
Education -.017 
(.681) 
.054 
(.185) 
-.070 
(.088) 
.130 
(.002) 
0 if below primary to 6 if 
double university degree 
Turk .079 
(.027) 
.013 
(.707) 
-.017 
(.629) 
.055 
(.127) 
1 if Turk, 0 if other 
Roma -.064 
(.075) 
-.089 
(.013) 
-.005 
(.883) 
.073 
(.044) 
1 if Roma, 0 if other 
Other 
ethnic 
.105 
(.002) 
.034 
(.313) 
.027 
(.424) 
.028 
(.421) 
1 if “other”, 0 if 
Bulgarian, Turk or Roma 
Birth year .000 
(.996) 
-.043 
(.236) 
-.037 
(.308) 
-.013 
(.714) 
Year of birth of 
respondent 
Residence -.086 
(.026) 
-.085 
(.029) 
-.041 
(.295) 
.054 
(.169) 
1 if village to 4 if capital 
city 
Income .002 
(.963) 
.040 
(.320) 
-.039 
(.330) 
-.059 
(.140) 
1 if below BGN 100 to 
13 if above BGN 651 
N 899 899 899 899  
Adj. R sq. .028 .014 .009 .011  
Notes: Dependent variable are scaled in the following manner: social trust is growing 
if trust in institutions is higher; interpersonal trust is growing if respondents agree with 
the respective statements; participation is 1 if the respondent is a member and 0 
otherwise. The coefficients shown are the standardized beta coefficients, with two-tail 
significance in parentheses. 
 
Analyzing impact factor by factor, it can be claimed that gender, age and income are 
not statistically important. Even though insignificant, it is interesting to note that 
younger age in Bulgaria has a negative impact on the four measures of social capital, 
but there may be some non-linearity in the relationship – for example, the group of the 
youngest (18-24 yrs.) as well as the group of oldest respondents have a level of 
generalized trust and of civic participation above the country average. At the same 
time, the level of household income has the expected positive impact on generalized 
trust and negative impact on trust in kin. The explanation for this, as in Iliev (2002), is 
that during transition the poor or unemployed gradually lost most of their social 
contacts reduced their interactions only to the family members and kin. At the same 
time the richer have more various opportunities for social contacts and they rather 
prefer to associate with people having similar social status than with kin or relatives. 
Despite the lack of statistical significance, it is interesting to note that household 
income has virtually zero effect on social trust and an interesting negative effect on 
civic participation.  
 
Education does not determine social trust (the coefficient is negative), as well as 
generalized trust (positive coefficient), but has a marginally significant explanatory 
power for trust in kin, with higher education meaning less reliance on kin only. 
Education is strongly and positively significant in explaining civic participation, 
meaning that the more educated people are, the more likely they are to participate in 
informal non-political organizations. 
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The impact of the type of place of residence, contrary to education, has explanatory 
power for social and generalized trust, but not for trust in kin (negative coefficient) 
and for civic participation (positive coefficient). Residents of smaller settlements 
(villages and towns) tend to have higher levels of social and of generalized trust than 
residents of larger settlements such as regional centers and the capital city. 
 
In terms of ethnic identity, the group of respondents identifying themselves as Roma 
is clearly different from other ethnic groups. Belonging to this group is statistically 
significantly linked with lower levels of social and generalized trust, and with higher 
civic participation. The latter finding may be due to the fact that there have been many 
active programs aiming at civic organization of the Roma over the last 15 years, and 
their work may be resulting in higher participation. With respect to the Turkish ethnic 
group, it is positively related to social trust, and to civic participation, but is 
insignificant with respect to interpersonal trust. Belonging to the any “other” (non-
Bulgarian, Turk or Roma) ethnic groups means significantly higher level of social 
trust, but is insignificant with respect to the other measures of social capital. 
 
The so described picture of the level of social capital in Bulgaria could be 
complemented with some observations on the behavior of the respondents. More than 
half of the respondents reported they would rather deal with people they know in case 
of renting apartment (63 %) or buying second-hand car (63 %) than with strangers. 
The data presented in Table 3 shows whom and to what extent people trust, measured 
through the classical situation of borrowing money. The biggest part of Bulgarians 
would ask for money at the first place their kin and relatives. A big part of the 
respondents rely also on friends but they are mostly second preferable option, while 
the level of trust based on neighborhood and collegial relations is very low. At the 
same time trust in banks is significant. This is probably related to the recent increase 
of the bank loans for the citizens in Bulgaria. In 2003 the banks granted twice more 
loans than 2002. 
 
The women, the group of the youngest and the oldest respondents and those with 
lower education and low household incomes as well as the Turkish ethnic group rely 
more on the kin/relatives in similar situations in comparison to respondents with 
higher education and incomes. The data show that the most trust in friends, as 
preferable first option to borrow money, has the groups of the richest (41 %), 
employed (29 %) and university graduated (26 %). This indirectly proves the fact that 
these social groups have more and high quality social contacts based on so called 
“process based trust” (friends) as opposed to “ascribed trust” (kin/relatives). 
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Table 3. Urgent money needed – responses from Bulgaria 
Imagine the following situation: you need some money urgently, which you do not 
dispose of and can hardly get yourself. 
 Who will ask first? And which other? 
Kin/relatives 64 % 18 % 
Friends 21 % 47 % 
Neighbors 3 % 12 % 
Colleagues 1 % 4 % 
Employer 1 % 2 % 
Bank 8 % 12 % 
Other institution 1 % 3 % 
No one 1 % 2 % 
 
Another interesting situation to be observed in order to understand how people 
operationalize trust is obtaining of information.  People often use their social contacts 
to obtain information about the jobs, prices of goods or crops etc. In many cases these 
informal channels of information may be more important than the official sources of 
information. On the other hand in many societies people are more willing to consider 
information obtained through their social contacts more reliable and effective than the 
one provided by the institutions. Table 4 contains data about the three most important 
sources of information about what government is doing and about the market 
information. 
 
Table 4. Sources of government and market information in Bulgaria 
What are the three most important sources of information about: 
 Government activities/policies Market data/events 
Television 93 % 74 % 
National Newspaper 60 % 50 % 
Radio 60 % 49 % 
Relatives, friends, neighbors 40 % 45 % 
Community/local newspaper 11 % 24 % 
Community bulletin board 8 % 19 % 
Internet 3 % 6 % 
Business or work association 2 % 7 % 
Groups of associations 1 % 3 % 
Community leaders 3 % 3 % 
 
In both cases the television is indisputable leader in providing of information, 
followed by national radio and newspapers. However, they have less influence 
regarding market information relative to information about government. Information 
obtained through relatives, friends and neighbors has less influence regarding 
government performance but stronger when it comes to market information. This 
means of obtaining information about the government performance is more common 
for the groups of the youngest, those with primary education, low household income 
and those who live in the villages. In contrast to this the richer, those with high 
education and living in the regional centers and the capital prefer to obtain 
information through television, radio, newspapers and Internet. 
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However, differences are much slighter with regard to market information. This 
means of obtaining market information is still important for most of the respondents 
no mater what their household income, settlement and age are. The group of the 
respondents with university education rely less on relatives, friends and neighbors for 
obtaining market information than the others. 
 
Obtaining both types of information through relatives, friends and neighbors is more 
important for the minority groups than for the others. This observation shows that 
Roma and Turks live in comparatively more closed and united communities where the 
social contacts have stronger influence over the members of the group. 
 
Besides the 3% of the respondents claiming participation in informal organizations, 
on the national level 4 % of respondents report they are members of political party or 
organization. The most active age group in this respect are the oldest (7 %). Most of 
these people are members of Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), which inherited the 
Communist party and still manage to maintain the most numerous party membership 
amongst all political parties in the country. Similarly to other forms of participation, 
education correlates positively with participation in political organizations. The level 
of party membership among Turks is equal as a percentage to this among Bulgarians, 
while under 1 % of Roma respondents report they are members of any political 
organization. 
 
Respondents having higher income and residents of the capital city are less willing to 
participate in political parties than those living in the regional centers, small towns 
and villages, as well as respondents with lower household income. This indicates that 
there is no positive correlation between party membership and the better political and 
economic performance. 
 
An important aspect of civic participation is participation in collective actions, which 
can be divided in two basic directions: having political and having communal 
character. About 14 % of the respondents in Bulgaria report they have participated in 
any political meeting or electoral campaign over the last thirteen years. The better 
educated and these with higher household incomes report level of activity above the 
average for the country. 
 
The same number of respondents - 14 %, reports that they or members of their family 
have participated in any communal activities over the last year. Amongst these 
respondents 25% reported one participation, 38 % two and 15 % three. The 
participation in communal actions is positively correlating with the education level, 
household income and the size of settlement. It is not surprising that the group of the 
oldest and retired is more active in such actions than the others as they have more free 
time. 
 
 1.c. Policy implications of the data 
 
The data from Bulgaria offer a first look at the relevance of some of the basic 
assumptions informing the different policy recommendations mentioned above. 
 
The Bulgarian data does provide some support for two of the assumptions discussed 
in the introduction. Namely, it seems that institutional performance does (weakly) 
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affect trust, and that local institutions are better regarded than more institutions which 
are socially more distant from the respondents. 
 
The respondents, who have had actual experience with various state institutions report 
relatively great satisfaction with the performance of these institutions: the Tax Office 
(65 %), the Education (64 %), the Health System (60 %), the Municipality (59 %), the 
Court (51 %), and Police (50 %). These respondents reported also comparatively high 
levels of fair treatment on behalf of the institutions. The translation of these results 
into higher social trust, however, is not straight forward. The correlations between a 
given respondent’s high satisfaction with the service received in dealing with the 
respective institutions (municipality, court, police and tax office) and the same 
respondent’s high evaluation of the same institutions in general are not very high, 
ranging from 0.31 for the local government to 0.22 for the tax office. 
 
The inference from these low correlations is that respondents’ perceptions are only 
weakly related to their actual experiences. Thus, it seems that there is an a-priori 
negativism about government institutions in Bulgaria, and that actual experience of 
people with well performing institutions does impact their opinion, but very weakly. 
So the chain from well performing institutions to positive perceptions about this 
performance, to positive evaluation and trust, may exist in Bulgaria, but is weak, and 
may be indefinitely slow. 
 
At the same time, the data indicate that people in Bulgaria feel more empowered to 
influence government institutions which are closer to them socially and 
geographically, such as municipal authorities. Inasmuch as such feeling of 
empowerment is a precondition for trust, the proposition that transfer of more 
authority to the local governments will increase social capital may be reasonable for 
Bulgaria. 
 
On the other hand, the economic hypothesis is not supported by the Bulgarian data. 
As is visible in Table 2, income as a general measure of command over resources, is 
not related to any of the measures of social capital in terms of statistical significance. 
The same holds for the subjective evaluation of personal well-being (level of 
appreciation of present economic situation of the household), and the measure of 
social trust, where the correlation is statistically significant, but very low at 0.07. 
Thus, at least in Bulgaria, it cannot be assumed that economic development will lead 
to an increase in social capital. This finding is supported by alternative recent 
evidence from Bulgaria (Global Bulgaria, 2004), where it is found that a majority of 
the people who have benefited from reforms in terms of their economic situation, tend 
to believe that this has happened despite, rather than with the help of, public 
institutions, and thus tend to have very low level of trust in and optimism about the 
developments in the public realm. In the context of the models studied here, this 
translates into low to negative correlation (as is the case in Macedonia and Serbia and 
Montenegro) between economic well-being and social trust. 
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2. Macedonia 
 
 2.a. Context 
 
The population of Macedonia is about 2 million people, of whom 50% women. 
Ethnically, the country is composed of two large groups – a majority of Macedonians 
(about two thirds of the population), and a minority of Albanians (about one quarter of 
the population), with other groups (Turks, Serbs, Roma, Wallachs and others) being 
very small. About 60% of the population is urban. 
 
The per capita GDP in Macedonia for 2003 is EUR 2,040 (EUR 6,400 at Purchasing 
Power Parity), and the average net monthly wage is EUR 190. In 2002, approximately 
27% of the total population was employed, of which 5% in industry (all data are from 
WIIW Balkan Observatory). 
 
The Macedonian health system is centered around the general practitioners and the 
Health Insurance Fund (HIF), which is financed through a tax. Primary care is 
privatized to a large extent, while secondary care is mostly state-owned. The service 
package covered by the government scheme is very broad, leaving a small room for 
private provision and insurance. 
 
The Macedonian education system has four levels – primary, secondary, high, and 
higher education. The costs of education are covered by the state for all levels, and the 
state also subsidizes accommodation and meals for high and higher education 
students. Three percent of the high-schools are private, but there are no private 
universities. An important aspect of the primary school structure is the division of 
schools by their primary language according to the different minorities in the country. 
The higher education system debate is to a large extent dominated by the ethnic 
division in the country. 
 
The data source for Macedonia is a quantity sociological survey, conducted from 1st 
till 10th November 2003 by BRIMA (the local BBSS Gallup office). It is nationally 
representative survey among the Macedonian population aged 18+. The achieved 
sample size amounts to 1 021 effective interviews. 
 
 2.b. Socio-demographic determinants of social capital 
 
Table 5 describes the regression results of the analysis of the impact of the six socio-
demographic factors on the various measures of social capital in Macedonia. It 
provides a basis for some inferences about social capital in the Macedonian context. 
 
The overall measures of social capital in Macedonia are low, and different measures 
show more contrasts than in Bulgaria. If the social trust variable is split into five 
ranges, 54% of the respondents fall in the lower two ranges, 39% - in the middle 
range, and only 7% - in the top two ranges. In contrast, however, 48% of the 
respondents claim trust in most people, with 38% disagreeing with the statement that 
most people can be trusted. At the same time a dominating 72% of Macedonian 
respondents claim that only one’s kin can be trusted. About 6% (almost double the 
proportion in Bulgaria) of the respondents are members of informal non-political 
organizations. 
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These differences notwithstanding, as in the case of Bulgaria the socio-demographic 
factors have very small explanatory power with respect to all four measures of social 
capital used in the analysis. Thus for Macedonia it is also true that, with small 
exceptions, the factors explaining the variation of the measures of social capital, are 
different from the traditionally used socio-demographic measures. For social trust, 
and for interpersonal trust (both generalized trust and trust in kin), only one or two 
socio-demographic variables are statistically significant. More socio-demographic 
variables are statistically significant in explaining civic participation. 
 
Table 5. Impact of socio-demographics on social capital in Macedonia 
Interpersonal trust Variable 
name 
Social 
trust Generalized kin 
Civic par-
ticipation 
Description 
Constant (.669) (.000) (.000) (.000)  
Female .028 
(.389) 
-.028 
(.392) 
-.006 
(.846) 
-.111 
(.001) 
0 if male, 1 if female 
Education -.017 
(.659) 
.078 
(.040) 
-.037 
(.325) 
.141 
(.000) 
0 if below primary to 6 if 
higher and university 
Albanian -.024 
(.493) 
.011 
(.749) 
.197 
(.000) 
.090 
(.009) 
1 if Albanian, 0 if other 
Turk .022 
(.506) 
.036 
(.265) 
.045 
(.162) 
-.001 
(.974) 
1 if Turk, 0 if other 
Roma .029 
(.376) 
-.015 
(.642) 
.048 
(.141) 
.005 
(.877) 
1 if Roma, 0 if other 
Other 
ethnic 
.031 
(.340) 
-.009 
(.781) 
.033 
(.302) 
.038 
(.234) 
1 if other than Albanian, 
Macedonian, Turk, Roma 
Birth year .013 
(.700) 
-.021 
(.533) 
-.038 
(.260) 
-.102 
(.003) 
Year of birth of 
respondent 
Residence -.145 
(.000) 
-.028 
(.431) 
-.009 
(.808) 
-.040 
(.268) 
1 if village to 4 if capital 
city 
Income .054 
(.139) 
.108 
(.003) 
.009 
(.813) 
.000 
(1.000) 
1 if below 3000 to 12 if 
above 45000 denara 
N 962 962 962 962  
Adj. R sq. .011 .016 .035 .035  
Notes: Dependent variable are scaled in the following manner: social trust is growing 
if trust in institutions is higher; interpersonal trust is growing if respondents agree with 
the respective statements; participation is 1 if the respondent is a member and 0 
otherwise. The coefficients shown are the standardized beta coefficients, with two-tail 
significance in parentheses. 
 
Analyzing the results factor by factor, it is interesting to note that with the exception 
of the Albanian minority with respect to trust in kin and civic participation, ethnic 
identification is not a determinant of social capital. None of the four ethnic dummies 
is statistically significant in the social and generalized trust regressions. However, 
belonging to the Albanian ethnic groups strongly and significantly increases the trust 
in kin and the likelihood that the respondent is a member of an informal non-political 
organization. This can be attributed to the specific ethnic situation in Macedonia, 
where the Albanian ethnic group is of significant size and is socially and 
geographically separated from the ethnic majority, thus forming and relying on close 
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kinship ties. Also, the actions of the Albanian minority aimed at obtaining and 
increasing their political recognition are related to increased informal activity and 
membership as well. 
 
Education is significant in explaining generalized trust and civic participation, in both 
cases more education being associated with higher social capital. At the same time, 
the educational level of the respondents does not explain social trust and trust in kin 
(in both cases the insignificant estimated coefficients are negative). 
 
The type of the place of residence is the only socio-demographic factor in Macedonia, 
which has explanatory power for the level of social trust. The estimated coefficient is 
relatively large, and negative, indicating that smaller settlements (villages and small 
towns) are associated with higher levels of social trust than larger towns and the 
capital city. The estimated coefficients of the impact of the place of residence on the 
other social capital measures (interpersonal trust and civic participation) are also 
negative, but are statistically insignificant. 
 
Household income, on the other hand, is very weakly related to social trust, and 
strongly related to generalized trust. In both cases the relationship is estimated as 
positive, indicating an increase in social capital related to an increase in income. At 
the same time, household income is completely unrelated to trust in kin and to civic 
participation. 
 
The impact of gender and age on the various measures of social capital in Macedonia 
is almost identical. Even though statistically insignificant, being female and of 
younger age are positively related to social trust, and negatively related to 
interpersonal trust. Both factors, however, are strongly significant and negatively 
related to civic participation. This means that men and older people are more likely to 
engage in informal civic organizations. In the case of gender impact, the coefficient 
may be explained by the fact that among Albanians in Macedonia (who are especially 
active in civic organizations), men tend to dominate over women in terms of activism. 
 
As a supplement to the attitude data, analyzed so far, some behavioral traits expressed 
by respondents in Macedonia can enrich the understanding of the state of social 
capital in the country. The data presented in Table 6 shows whom and to what extent 
people thrust, measured through the classical situation of borrowing money. The 
biggest part of Macedonians would ask for money at the first place their kin and 
relatives. A large part of the respondents rely also on friends but they are mostly 
second preferable option, while the level of trust based on neighborhood and collegial 
relations is very low. At the same time trust in banks is significant, coming third after 
family and friends. 
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Table 6. Urgent money needed – responses from Macedonia 
Imagine the following situation: you need some money urgently, which you do not 
dispose of and can hardly get yourself. 
 Who will ask first? And which other? 
Kin/relatives 58 % 20 % 
Friends 22 % 44 % 
Neighbors 2 % 7 % 
Colleagues 1 % 6 % 
Employer 2 % 4 % 
Bank 13 % 15 % 
Other institution 1 % * 
Do not know 1 % 4 % 
 
On everyday behavioral level, the level of trust people have can be inferred from their 
choice of sources of information, since people tend to select sources they consider as 
trustworthy. They often use their interpersonal; contacts to obtain information about 
the jobs, prices of goods or crops etc. In many cases these informal channels of 
information may be more important than the official (institutional) sources of 
information. The data presented in Table 7 provide us a good opportunity to compare 
the official and unofficial means of information about what is government is doing 
and about the market.  
 
Table 7. Sources of government and market information in Macedonia 
What are the three most important sources of information about: 
 Government activities/policies Market data/events 
Television 87 % 74 % 
National Newspaper 43 % 42 % 
Radio 45 % 40 % 
Relatives, friends, neighbors 51 % 51 % 
Community/local newspaper 10 % 10 % 
Community bulletin board 3 % 5 % 
Internet 3 % 3 % 
Business or work association 3 % 5 % 
 
In both cases television is indisputable leader in providing of information. However, it 
has less influence regarding market information in comparison with information about 
overall performance. The second most important sources of information are relatives, 
friends and neighbors. The radio and national newspapers have also comparatively 
strong influence over the both types of providing with information. Except for 
television, the other sources of information in Macedonia are equally important and 
used by respondents for government and for market information. 
 
In terms of what government is doing relatives, friends and neighbors are more 
preferable means of obtaining information for the Albanians, while television is more 
important for the Macedonians. This picture is completely different whit respect to 
market information: Albanians tend to rely less on relatives, friends and neighbors 
than Macedonians. Relatives, friends and neighbors are more common means of 
obtaining information about the government performance for the groups of the older, 
those with no and low education and low household income. In contrast, richer, more 
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educated and capital city residents prefer to obtain information through television, 
radio, newspapers and Internet. 
 
As a whole 5 % of the respondents report they are members of any informal but 
permanent non-political organization. There are some more considerable differences 
between the main demographic groups that should be outlined. The results clearly 
shows that man more active in informal organizations. Approximately thrice more 
men (9 %) than women (3 %) report they are members of similar organizations. The 
group of the senior respondents (between 35 –60 yrs.) is more active in informal 
organizations than the oldest and the youngest respondents. 
 
In terms of political civic participation, on the national level 10 % of respondents 
report they are members of political party or organization. In comparison to the region 
it is above the average level of party membership what indicates that political parties 
playing stronger social role compared to Bulgaria for example. 
 
It is noteworthy that about twice more of men are members of any political party in 
comparison to women. This gender misbalance is owed mostly to the group of 
Albanians. The average level of party membership amongst Albanians is 6 % but in 
terms of gender the distribution is 11% of the men and only 4 % of the women. This 
observation clearly shows that in Albanian community, similarly to the practice of the 
traditional societies, the opportunities for political actions for the women are 
restricted. 
 
The most active age group in party membership is this of the respondents between 25 
and 60 yrs. The oldest and the youngest are less interested in political party 
participation. Similarly to other forms of civic participation, education correlates 
positively with participation in political organizations. In this case not only the higher 
and university education are important determining factors but also the secondary 
education. 
 
With respect to civic participation in collective action, 36 % of respondents in 
Macedonia report they have participated in any political meeting or electoral 
campaign over the whole transition period. This level of political participation is twice 
higher than the one in Bulgaria. Amongst the basic socio-demographic factors the 
education and household incomes are positively associated with the participation in 
similar actions. 
 
The level of participation in communal activities is much lower compared to activities 
with political character. About 14 % of the respondents report they or members of 
their family have participated in any communal activities over the last year. Amongst 
these respondents 30 % reported one participation, 34 % two and 14 % three. The 
participation in communal actions is positively correlating with the education level 
and negatively with the size of settlement. The better educated and the village 
residents are amongst the most active in communal activities. 
 
 2.c. Policy implications of the data 
 
The data from Macedonia also offer a first look at the relevance of some of the basic 
assumptions informing the different policy recommendations mentioned above. 
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The Macedonian data does provide some support for two of the assumptions 
discussed in the introduction. Namely, it seems that institutional performance does 
affect trust, and that local institutions are better regarded than more institutions which 
are socially more distant from the respondents. 
 
The respondents, who have had actual experience with the institutions in Macedonia 
report relatively great satisfaction with the performance of these institutions: the 
Education (66 %), the Health System (62 %), the Police (54 %), the Municipality (52 
%), the Tax Office (49 %), and the Court (39 %). These respondents report even 
higher levels of fair treatment on behalf of the institutions. As in the case of Bulgaria, 
however, the correlations between personal experiences (and satisfaction) and general 
evaluation and trust in the institutions are not high – ranging from 0.07 for the courts, 
and 0.23 for the tax office. Again, the inference is that this channel for enhancing 
social capital, while existing, is weak and possibly slow. 
 
At the same time, as in the case of Bulgaria, the data indicate that people in 
Macedonia feel more empowered to influence government institutions which are 
closer to them socially and geographically, such as municipal authorities. This 
provides tentative support for the hypothesis that strengthening and empowering local 
institutions may help increase social capital in Macedonia. 
 
The Macedonian data are indecisive with respect to the importance of economic 
factors in the formation of social capital. As is visible in Table 5, income as a general 
measure of command over resources, is not related to most measures of social capital, 
except for the level of generalized trust. The result is even more striking for the 
subjective evaluation of personal well-being (level of appreciation of present 
economic situation of the household), and the measure of social trust, where the 
correlation is statistically significant, but negative at -0.19. Thus, in Macedonia as 
well as in Bulgaria, it cannot be assumed that economic development will necessarily 
and quickly lead to an increase in social capital. 
 
3. Serbia and Montenegro 
 
 3.a. Context 
 
All data, as well as the surveys, for Serbia and Montenegro are excluding Kosovo and 
Metohija. 
 
Serbia and Montenegro are populated by about 8.1 million people – 7.5 million in 
Serbia, and 0.6 million in Montenegro, with women comprising 51% of the 
population. Serbs account for about 83% of the population in Serbia and for about 
15% of the population in Montenegro, and Montenegrins – for 62% of the population 
in Montenegro. Besides Serbs and Montenegrins, minorities in Serbia and 
Montenegro include Muslims, Hungarians, Roma. A small but important group are 
the people who identify themselves as Yugoslavs. About 62% of the population in 
Serbia, and about 54% of the population in Montenegro is urban. 
 
Per capita GDP in Serbia and Montenegro is about EUR 2,050 for 2003, and the 
average net monthly wage is about EUR 190. In 2002, about 27% of the total 
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population was employed, of which 8% in industry (all data are from WIIW Balkan 
Observatory). 
 
The health care system in Serbia and Montenegro covers to a large degree the urban 
and rural populations. Primary care is a combination between public and private 
provision. Secondary care is state-owned. The costs for health care provision are 
covered by the revenues of the social security system, and citizens are guaranteed free 
care. However, the system of financing results in shortages in supplies and equipment 
for the state-owned health providers, and high prices at the private ones. 
 
The education system in Serbia includes primary, secondary, higher, and university 
education, while in Montenegro it is primary, secondary, and university. Primary 
education is free and compulsory. Secondary education is also free, except for private 
secondary schools in Serbia, which are increasing in number. Higher education is 
provided by non-university entities (in Serbia), and by universities (in both Serbia and 
Montenegro). The only university in Montenegro is state-owned, and the costs are 
covered by a mix of state subsidies and student contributions. There are 3 private 
universities in Serbia, and students in Serbia are divided into “students on budget” and 
“self-financing students”. 
 
The data source for Serbia and Montenegro are two quantity sociological surveys, one 
for Serbia and one for Montenegro, conducted from 30th October till 6th November 
2003 by BBSS Gallup. Both surveys are nationally representative among the 
population aged 18+ in Serbia and Montenegro respectively. The achieved sample 
size amounts to 816 effective interviews for Serbia, and to 402 effective interviews 
for Montenegro. 
 
 3.b. Socio-demographic determinants of social capital 
 
 3.b.1. Serbia 
 
Table 8 describes the regression results of the analysis of the impact of the six socio-
demographic factors on the various measures of social capital in Serbia. It provides a 
basis for some inferences about social capital in the Serbian context. 
 
The overall measures of social capital in Serbia are low. If the social trust variable is 
split into five ranges, 49% of the respondents fall in the lower two ranges, 37% - in 
the middle range, and 14% - in the top two ranges. In the case of Serbia, these data do 
not qualitatively contrast with the data on generalized trust: 33% of the respondents 
claim trust in most people, with 39% disagreeing with the statement that most people 
can be trusted. The belief that only one’s kin can be trusted is much lower in Serbia 
than in Bulgaria or Macedonia – less than half (48%) of the respondents agree with 
the statement. At the same time, 11% (almost double the proportion in Macedonia, 
and almost four times more than in Bulgaria) of the respondents are members of 
informal non-political organizations. 
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Table 8. Impact of socio-demographics on social capital in Serbia 
Interpersonal trust Variable 
name 
Social 
trust Generalized kin 
Civic par-
ticipation 
Description 
Constant (.308) (.000) (.000) (.000)  
Female .081 
(.035) 
.037 
(.347) 
.039 
(.335) 
-.190 
(.000) 
0 if male, 1 if female 
Education -.002 
(.960) 
-.025 
(.597) 
-.152 
(.001) 
-.022 
(.641) 
0 if below primary to 6 if 
higher and university 
Muslim -.044 
(.253) 
.105 
(.009) 
.080 
(.048) 
-.004 
(.912) 
1 if Muslim, 0 if other 
Yugoslav .057 
(.141) 
.025 
(.525) 
.004 
(.917) 
.052 
(.189) 
1 if Yugoslav, 0 if other 
Madjar .005 
(.896) 
.030 
(.455) 
-.010 
(.801) 
.069 
(.082) 
1 if Madjar, 0 if other 
Other 
ethnic 
.163 
(.000) 
.045 
(.254) 
.040 
(.315) 
-.027 
(.491) 
1 if other than Serbian, 
Muslim, Yugoslav, 
Madjar 
Birth year .118 
(.006) 
-.048 
(.272) 
-.030 
(.505) 
.053 
(.233) 
Year of birth of 
respondent 
Residence -.277 
(.000) 
.092 
(.028) 
.125 
(.003) 
-.022 
(.600) 
1 if village to 4 if capital 
city 
Income .040 
(.362) 
-.144 
(.002) 
.016 
(.723) 
.023 
(.616) 
1 if below EUR 50 to 9 if 
above EUR 1400 
N 616 616 616 616  
Adj. R sq. .101 .039 .030 .035  
Notes: Dependent variable are scaled in the following manner: social trust is growing 
if trust in institutions is higher; interpersonal trust is growing if respondents agree with 
the respective statements; participation is 1 if the respondent is a member and 0 
otherwise. The coefficients shown are the standardized beta coefficients, with two-tail 
significance in parentheses. 
 
As in the case of Bulgaria and Macedonia, socio-demographic factors do not seem to 
have explanatory power with respect to the various measures of social capital. Only in 
the case of social trust the socio-demographic structure can be considered as 
marginally useful in explaining social capital. But, again, the basic inference is that 
variation in social capital in Serbia, as well as in all other countries studied here, is 
due to factors other than the socio-demographic ones. 
 
Analyzing the impact factor by factor, in the case of Serbia the most interesting and 
informative one seems to be the type of place of residence. This factor is statistically 
significant for three of the four measures of social trust, and has no explanatory power 
only for civic participation. The size of the place of residence is negatively related to 
social trust and civic participation, but is positively related to interpersonal trust. The 
impact of age (the mirror of the variable “birth year”) is identical to that of place of 
residence, even though it is significant only in the case of social trust. The age of the 
respondents in Serbia is negatively correlated with social trust and with civic 
participation, but positively – with the measures of interpersonal trust. 
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In Serbia, gender seems to be important with respect to social trust – it is statistically 
significant in the case of social trust and civic participation. Women have higher 
social and interpersonal trust, but tend to participate in civic organizations less than 
men. 
 
Education has a negative impact on all four measures of social capital in Serbia, but 
this impact is statistically significant only in the case of trust in kin, where it is also 
largest. Thus a specific feature of Serbian society is that more educated people seem 
to trust and to participate less than the average. 
 
Income does not seem to be important for social capital in Serbia. It is positively, but 
insignificantly, related to social trust, trust in kin, and civic participation. It is 
strongly, and significantly negatively related to generalized trust – richer people in 
Serbia tend to disagree with the statement that most people can be trusted. 
 
The household income variable is the only one which has a qualitatively different 
impact on generalized trust and on trust in kin. All other socio-demographic factors 
have very similar impact on both measures of interpersonal trust. Thus, in the case of 
Serbia, generalized trust and trust in kin can be viewed as complements rather than as 
alternatives. 
 
The ethnic structure of society in Serbia has a limited impact on the measures of 
social capital. Being Muslim has a negative (but insignificant and relatively small) 
impact on social trust, and positive (and significant) impact on interpersonal trust. 
Respondents with Yugoslav identity score higher (even though insignificantly) in all 
measures of social capital. Members of the Hungarian minority seem to be more 
active in civic organizations, while belonging to some of the “other” ethnic groups is 
strongly associated with higher social trust. 
 
On the level of behavior of respondents, the data from Serbia offers an interesting 
contrast. While more than 70% of the respondents declare, that they would rather deal 
with people they know when renting an apartment of buying a second hand car, more 
than half choose a bank as a first choice in monetary emergency (Table 9). Only about 
a third of the respondents claim they would first turn to relatives, and for about 85 the 
first choice would be the employer. This situation is markedly different from all other 
countries studied, and indicates that institutionalized trust (in banks and employers) 
may be an important aspect of social capital in Serbia. 
 
Table 9. Urgent money needed – responses from Serbia 
Imagine the following situation: you need some money urgently, which you do not 
dispose of and can hardly get yourself. 
 Who will ask first? And which other? 
Kin/relatives 34 % 41 % 
Friends 4 % 11 % 
Neighbors 2 % 9 % 
Colleagues * 1 % 
Employer 8 % 11 % 
Bank 51 % 22 % 
Other institution * 1 % 
Do not know 1 % 5 % 
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At the same time, respondents in Serbia are not different from respondents from the 
other countries studied in their strategies in acquiring information. As everywhere 
else, television is the most important source of information, and official channels of 
information tend to dominate as sources. 
 
Table 10. Sources of government and market information in Serbia 
What are the three most important sources of information about: 
 Government activities/policies Market data/events 
Television 86 % 73 % 
National Newspaper 56 % 54 % 
Radio 45 % 41 % 
Relatives, friends, neighbors 50 % 47 % 
Community/local newspaper 8 % 11 % 
An agent of the government 5 % 4 % 
Internet 6 % 7 % 
Business or work associates 5 % 7 % 
Groups or associations 4 % 5 % 
 
Relatives, friends and neighbors come as a third most important source of information 
in Serbia. As in the other countries, reliance on official channels for obtaining 
government information is higher than reliance on official channels for market 
information.  
 
With respect to collective action and participation in Serbia, 14% of the respondents 
are members of some formal non-political association (civic, labor, professional, etc.), 
11% are members of informal organizations (clubs, hobbies, church groups, etc.), and 
8% are members of registered political parties or organizations. With respect to civic 
participation and membership, men are significantly more active than women, not 
only in informal organizations, as already mentioned, but in political organizations as 
well (13% vs. 4% respectively). Participation is positively correlated with the level of 
education and household income for all three types of organizations – formal and 
informal non-political and political. In terms of ethnic patterns, it is notable that 
Hungarians are very active in their civic participation (35% are members of a forma 
non-political organization, 27% - of an informal non-political organization, and 21% - 
of a party), Montenegrins are active mostly in formal organizations (49% in non-
political and 21% in political), and Muslims are highly politically active (26% are 
members of a political organization). 
 
In terms of participation in collective actions, rather than membership in civic 
organizations, the situation is similar, but with a higher level of involvement – 39% of 
respondents have been involved in some sort of political action during transition, and 
20% have participated in some form of communal activity over the last year, with the 
majority of them (three quarters of the activists) participating more than once. Again, 
the gender differences are significant, with men more active (47% in political, and 
26% in communal actions) than women (31% and 14% respectively). Political 
activism is highly positively correlated, and communal activism only weakly 
positively linked, with the level of education and of household income. Younger 
people (18-44 years of age) are significantly more politically active, but this is not 
true for communal activism. Also, among ethnic groups, Montenegrins and Muslims 
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are highly politically active, while all minorities are more active than Serbs in 
communal events. 
 
 3.b.2. Montenegro 
 
Table 11 describes the regression results of the analysis of the impact of the six socio-
demographic factors on the various measures of social capital in Montenegro. It 
provides a basis for some inferences about social capital in the Montenegrin context. 
 
The overall measures of social capital in Montenegro are low, and there are some 
contrasts between different measures. If the social trust variable is split into five 
ranges, 36% of the respondents fall in the lower two ranges, 43% - in the middle 
range, and 21% - in the top two ranges. This measurement is in contrast with the 
measurement of generalized trust, where only 19% of the respondents claim trust in 
most people, with 40% disagreeing with the statement that most people can be trusted. 
The belief that only one’s kin can be trusted is Montenegro is the lowest among the 
countries studied – 38% of the respondents agree with the statement. At the same 
time, 12% (about equal to Serbia, almost double the proportion in Macedonia, and 
almost four times more than in Bulgaria) of the respondents are members of informal 
non-political organizations. 
 
As already established for the other countries studied, socio-demographic factors in 
Montenegro have low explanatory power with respect to the different measures of 
social capital. Interestingly, the explanatory power of socio-demographic factors in 
Montenegro is visibly weaker than in Serbia. 
 
Analyzing factor by factor, household income and gender are insignificant in all four 
models studied. Despite the insignificance, the results indicate a slight positive 
relationship between level of income and the different measures of social capital. In 
contrast to the results from the other three surveys, in Montenegro the type of the 
place of residence does not explain any of the four measures of social capital. This 
may be due to the fact that Montenegro is the smallest in terms of population and 
territory, of the four countries studied, and this geographical characteristic may render 
differences between places of residence smaller than in larger countries. 
 
In general, age is positively related to social capital – with the exception of 
generalized trust (where the result is insignificant), younger people exhibit less trust 
and participate less than older people. This result is significant for the case of social 
trust, and contrasts the opposite finding for Serbia. Another contrast between Serbia 
and Montenegro is that the results of the different models suggest that the two 
measures of interpersonal trust (generalized trust and trust in kin) seem to be 
alternatives in Montenegro, while in Serbia they were found to be complements. 
 
The same contrast holds for the level of education – while in Serbia education has 
negative impact on the measures of social capital, it is exactly the opposite in 
Montenegro, with the result being marginally statistically significant for generalized 
trust. 
 
The ethnic structure of Montenegro has a weak impact on social capital. The two 
Islamic minorities – Muslims and Albanians – are significantly less likely to express 
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generalized trust than other ethnic groups. Interestingly, while for the case of the 
Muslim group this result translates almost one-to-one into higher than average trust 
for kin, this is not the case for Albanians, who are not more likely to trust their kin 
than the major ethnic groups in the country. The Albanian and the “other” ethnic 
groups are significantly less likely to engage in informal civic organizations than the 
rest of the respondents.  
 
Table 11. Impact of socio-demographics on social capital in Montenegro 
Interpersonal trust Variable 
name 
Social 
trust Generalized Kin 
Civic par-
ticipation 
Description 
Constant (.310) (.000) (.000) (.000)  
Female .086 
(.131) 
-.030 
(.600) 
-.022 
(.698) 
-.056 
(.316) 
0 if male, 1 if female 
Education .072 
(.262) 
.109 
(.089) 
.090 
(.166) 
.031 
(.629) 
0 if below primary to 6 if 
higher and university 
Serb -.079 
(.168) 
-.008 
(.893) 
.014 
(.810) 
-.085 
(.134) 
1 if Serb, 0 if other 
Muslim .070 
(.240) 
-.108 
(.068) 
.101 
(.092) 
.027 
(.650) 
1 if Muslim, 0 if other 
Albanian .053 
(.352) 
-.120 
(.035) 
-.001 
(.986) 
-.128 
(.024) 
1 if Albanian, 0 if other 
Other 
ethnic 
.000 
(.996) 
-.006 
(.919) 
.070 
(.220) 
-.151 
(.007) 
1 if other than 
Montenegrin, Serb, 
Muslim, Albanian 
Birth year -.127 
(.034) 
.067 
(.256) 
-.062 
(.303) 
-.040 
(.494) 
Year of birth of 
respondent 
Residence .061 
(.304) 
.050 
(.397) 
-.024 
(.682) 
-.096 
(.101) 
1 if village to 4 if capital 
city 
Income .085 
(.191) 
-.005 
(.937) 
.016 
(.805) 
.081 
(.210) 
1 if below EUR 50 to 9 if 
above EUR 1400 
N 320 320 320 320  
Adj. R sq. .011 .027 -.003 .037  
Notes: Dependent variable are scaled in the following manner: social trust is growing 
if trust in institutions is higher; interpersonal trust is growing if respondents agree with 
the respective statements; participation is 1 if the respondent is a member and 0 
otherwise. The coefficients shown are the standardized beta coefficients, with two-tail 
significance in parentheses. 
 
In terms of everyday behavior, approximately 60% of respondents from Montenegro 
prefer (and another 20% undecided) to deal with people they know when entering 
relatively important low-frequency, high value transactions such as buying a second-
hand car or renting an apartment. This indicates a relatively low propensity to rely on 
impersonal exchange mechanisms. 
 
Within this low level, there are some significant differences between different groups. 
Two groups specifically differ. The first one is people in the highest household 
income group, where less than half of the respondents would rather deal with people 
they know (with most of the rest not disagreeing, but staying undecided). The second 
group are the residents of the capital city, where less than a third of the respondents 
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tend to rely only on personal relations. Table 12 indicates further, that Montenegrins 
are much like Bulgarians and Macedonians than Serbs in their reaction to a 
hypothetical urgent need for money – they would rely most on family and friends, 
with banks coming as a distant third option. Reliance on family and friends is 
strongest among the very youngest cohort. The level of education is negatively related 
to reliance on family, but positively related to reliance on friends, again indicating that 
more educated people tend to develop “process-based trust”. Interestingly, residents 
of regional centers (but not the capital city) are the only group which relies 
approximately equally on family, friends and banks as a first choice in an emergency. 
 
Table 12. Urgent money needed – responses from Serbia 
Imagine the following situation: you need some money urgently, which you do not 
dispose of and can hardly get yourself. 
 Who will ask first? And which other? 
Kin/relatives 48 % 14 % 
Friends 23 % 39 % 
Neighbors 7 % 8 % 
Colleagues 1 % 4 % 
Employer * 1 % 
Bank 13 % 18 % 
Other institution 3 % * 
N/A 5 % 16 % 
 
With respect to obtaining information about what is happening, respondents in 
Montenegro tend to rely on official medial channels (Table 13). They include national 
electronic (radio and TV) and, especially strong in Montenegro, national print media. 
As a channel for communication, television is a dominant leader in providing 
government information, and less so in providing market information. Montenegrins 
seem to rely very little, significantly less than the other three countries studied, on 
informal information networks, such as family, friends, colleagues, business 
associates. With the exception of the network of family and friends, these less formal 
sources seem to be more widely used with respect to information about markets than 
about the government. 
 
Table 13. Sources of government and market information in Serbia 
What are the three most important sources of information about: 
 Government activities/policies Market data/events 
Television 86 % 76 % 
National Newspaper 67 % 65 % 
Radio 56 % 51 % 
Relatives, friends, neighbors 26 % 18 % 
Community/local newspaper 3 % 6 % 
An agent of the government 12 % 6 % 
Internet 1 % 7 % 
Business or work associates 3 % 9 % 
Groups or associations 3 % 5 % 
 
It is noteworthy that the younger people, the more educated, and the ones with higher 
household incomes tend to rely less on the informal information channels through 
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relatives, friends and neighbors, than older, less educated and poorer respondents, and 
to prefer more strongly television, and especially the newspapers. At the same time, 
reliance on the informal information network is very strong among members of the 
“other” ethnic groups, especially with respect to information about the government 
policies. Differences between various socio-demographic groups with respect to 
obtaining market information are much smaller than with respect to obtaining 
information about the government. Here, also, there are no significant differences in 
using the official vs. the informal information channels between different ethnic 
groups. 
 
Besides the fact that 12% of the respondents in Montenegro are members of informal 
organizations, membership in political parties is also relatively high - 10% are 
members of registered political parties or organizations. With respect to civic 
participation and membership, men are significantly more active than women not only 
in informal organizations, but also in political organizations (13% vs. 7% 
respectively). Participation in political organizations is positively related to the level 
of education and household income. Representatives from the “other” ethnic groups 
and residents of villages are significantly more active in participating in all three types 
of organizations – formal, informal, and political. 
 
In terms of participation in collective actions, rather than membership in civic 
organizations, the situation is similar, but with a higher level of involvement – 24% of 
respondents have been involved in some sort of political action during transition, and 
14% have participated in some form of communal activity over the last year, with the 
majority of them (about 70% of the activists) participating more than once. Again, the 
gender differences are significant, with men more active (34% in political, and 18% in 
communal actions) than women (15% and 10% respectively). There are no large 
ethnic differences with respect to political activism, but the members of the “other” 
ethnic groups are much more active communally than Montenegrins and Serbs. Also, 
there is a clear negative correlation between both political and communal activism, 
and the size of the place of residence of the respondents. 
 
 3.c. Policy implications of the data 
  
The data from Serbia and Montenegro enrich further the first look at the relevance of 
some of the basic assumptions informing the different policy recommendations 
mentioned above. 
 
The data from the surveys in Serbia and Montenegro, as from the other two surveys, 
does provide some support for two of the assumptions discussed in the introduction. 
Namely, it seems that institutional performance does affect trust, and that local 
institutions are better regarded than more institutions which are socially more distant 
from the respondents. 
 
The respondents who have had actual experience with the institutions in Serbia and 
Montenegro report relatively great satisfaction with the performance of these 
institutions, ranging from 40% for the tax office in Serbia to 92% for the town hall in 
Montenegro, with the level of satisfaction by the services received significantly higher 
in Montenegro than in Serbia. Yet, as in the cases of Bulgaria  and Macedonia, 
correlations between personal experiences (and satisfaction) and general evaluation 
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and trust in the institutions are not high – ranging from 0.18 for the courts in 
Montenegro, to 0.33 for the tax office in Serbia. Again, the inference is that this 
channel for enhancing social capital, while existing, is weak and possibly slow. 
 
At the same time, as in the case of the other two surveys, the data indicate that people 
in Serbia and Montenegro feel more empowered to influence government institutions 
which are closer to them socially and geographically, such as municipal authorities, 
and, in the case of Montenegro, regional authorities. This provides tentative support 
for the hypothesis that strengthening and empowering local institutions may help 
increase social capital in Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
Except for the significant negative relationship between household income and 
generalized trust in Serbia, the income variable does not cause any significant 
variation in social capital in Serbia and Montenegro. As in Macedonia, the result is 
even more striking for the subjective evaluation of personal well-being (level of 
appreciation of present economic situation of the household), and the measure of 
social trust, where the correlation is statistically significant, but negative at -0.12 for 
Serbia, and –0.24 for Montenegro. Thus, the data from Serbia and Montenegro 
conform with the finding from Bulgaria and Macedonia that it cannot be assumed that 
economic development will necessarily and quickly lead to an increase in social 
capital. 
 
IV. Summary and conclusions 
 
The present paper introduces overviews of survey results from four nationally 
representative samples (Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro), aimed at 
analyzing the link between some important socio-demographic factors and various 
measures of social capital, as well as at looking for evidence in support of some 
assumptions underlying different policy proposals targeting the level of social capital. 
 
The brief look at the context in each of the four countries indicates that they do form a 
region, characterized by relatively low levels of economic development, coupled with 
the need to complete various major social reforms, and with generally rich ethnic 
composition and relatively large minorities. 
 
The formal analysis of the impact of socio-demographic factors on the different 
measures of social capital results in the conclusion that these factors cannot serve as 
an explanation of the variations in social capital in all four surveys. In most cases, 
gender, age, and income have very weak explanatory power. Two important 
qualifications have to be made about this result. 
 
First, the link between age and social capital may be non-linear – a simple look at the 
data for all four countries points toward the possibility that both the youngest and the 
oldest cohorts of the respondents tend to score higher in the various measures of 
social capital than the middle-aged cohorts. Thus this link may actually exist, but in a 
more complex form. 
 
Second, the link (or the lack thereof) between income and social capital in the Balkans 
may be dependent on the overall low level of incomes in the whole region. Thus, it is 
theoretically possible that after income in the region reaches some threshold, a 
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positive link between income and social capital may emerge as statistically 
significant. Such a possibility cannot be rejected a priori, but the available data on the 
region does not allow for its testing. The lack of a link between income and social 
capital in the Balkans may also be related to another phenomenon which is widely 
spread in the region – the disillusioned winners. Many of the people who have won 
from the reforms of the transition period in the region have done so despite, not 
because, of the services of state institutions, in many cases actually abusing these 
institutions. These people are successful, but they have many, often very well 
grounded, reasons not to trust public institutions and other people, and for this reason 
their relatively high incomes do not necessarily translate into high social trust. 
 
The level of education is a statistically significant determinant of social capital in 
some cases, but there are substantive differences between the different countries – the 
strongest example being the exactly opposite impact of education on social capital in 
Serbia and in Montenegro. Possibly the most consistently important factor is the type 
of place of residence of the respondents, with most of the time (with the exception of 
trust in kin in Serbia), the link being negative, indicating that people living in smaller 
settlements tend to exhibit higher levels of social capital. In all four surveys, the 
ethnic structure is relevant in explaining a portion of the variation of social capital, but 
since ethnic structure is strongly country specific, the results are also highly specific 
for each country and no general inferences can be made for the whole region. 
 
The third task of the overviews was to look for support, or lack thereof, for some of 
the assumptions feeding various policy proposals targeting the level of social capital. 
More concretely, the data allow an initial conclusion about the relevance of four 
assumptions: that good institutional performance leads to higher social trust, that 
economic development leads to higher personal confidence and from there to higher 
social capital, that local institutions are more trusted and thus generate higher social 
capital than more distant national institutions, and that increased personal security 
results in higher social capital. 
 
The data from the four surveys provide support for one of these assumptions, a very 
tentative support for another one, and no support for the other two. 
 
The assumption, which is relatively well conforming with the survey results from 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro, is that empowerment of local 
authorities may enhance social trust and civic participation. This is due to the fact that 
people feel more empowered with local institutions. 
 
The assumption which is very tentatively supported, is that improvements in 
institutional performance cause higher subjective evaluations of this performance and 
from there – higher trust. While such a link can be found in the data, it is weak, and 
will take a very long time to work on its own. The reason for this is that people in the 
countries surveyed do not actively base their perceptions and evaluations on personal 
experience, and tend to follow existing, predominantly negative, stereotypes about the 
workings of public institutions. This “experience gap”, the gap between personal 
experience and personal perceptions and evaluations, is to be found everywhere in the 
region, and is quite severe in some cases. Due to the existence of the experience gap 
in the Balkans, if policies based on the assumption that institutional performance 
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increases trust are to be effective, they will need to be supplemented by other, 
perception enhancing policies. 
 
The assumptions which find no support in the four surveys, are that income and 
general economic well-being result in higher social capital, and that enhanced 
personal security are also positively related to social capital. The first one is negated 
by the formal regression results, as well as by the low and for three of the four surveys 
negative correlations between subjective well-being and social trust. This result, of 
course, is subject to the considerations about the complicated relationship between 
income levels and social trust discussed above. 
 
The second assumption cannot be directly checked within the surveys, because there 
is no specific “personal security” variable. It can, however, be indirectly, and 
admittedly imperfectly, checked by a between-country comparison. Of the four 
samples studied, the one from Bulgaria comes from a country which has been 
significantly more stable and more secure in terms of both physical threats and 
personal and property rights, than the other three societies over the recent years. 
Bulgaria is well on its way to becoming a member of the EU, and is already a member 
of NATO, with the respective consequences for both hard and soft security in the 
country. Yet, respondents from the Bulgarian sample do not exhibit any significant 
positive difference in terms of the social capital measures used in the study. Its score 
in social trust is marginally the best, but it is far from being the highest in terms of 
interpersonal trust and, especially, in civic participation. Given the relative closeness 
between Balkan societies, there is no reason to expect that improved and sustained 
hard and soft security in the region will necessarily and quickly lead to higher levels 
of social capital. As is the case with economic development, however, in the case of 
the link between security and social capital there may be some non-linearity. More 
concretely (we owe this point to Vladimir Gligorov), when public provision of 
security fails drastically, this may lead to enhancement of trust as mechanisms are 
developed by the people in the respective society to deal with the situation, because 
such mechanisms tend to rely on trust. 
 
In final account, the four policy assumptions may all be valid, but the latter two still 
need more careful examination and more precision in the formulation and testing of 
respective hypotheses. Thus the lack of statistical support for the last two policy 
assumptions should be viewed more as opening specific perspectives for further study 
than as conclusively rejecting them. 
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